Bitcoin Covenants Part 6: FE Covenants — Enforcing covenants through cryptographically restricted signing keys

Bitcoin Covenants Part 6: FE Covenants — Enforcing covenants through cryptographically restricted signing keys

Bitcoin Covenants Part 6: FE Covenants — Enforcing Covenants through Cryptographically Restricted Signing Keys

FE covenants encode spending constraints into the signing key, ensuring that only transactions satisfying predefined conditions can be signed. This is Part 6 in a series of technical articles about Bitcoin covenants by Cointelegraph Research. Read the previous article.

Changing Bitcoin’s consensus rules is a complex process, requiring coordination among network node operators, miners, developers, and economic actors. This coordination is challenging, contributing to Bitcoin’s base layer gradually becoming ossified.

Researchers have explored alternative methods to enforce covenant behavior without altering consensus rules. In May 2024, Jeremy Rubin, the original author of OP_CTV proposal (BIP-119), presented a solution in his paper titled "FE’d Up Covenants". His design utilizes functional encryption (FE) to shift the covenant from Bitcoin Script to the signing key.

Functional Encryption: Keys that Only Sign What the Rules Allow

Functional encryption generalizes public-key encryption. In traditional schemes, a private key unlocks any ciphertext. In FE, a master secret generates subsidiary functional keys, each revealing only specific functions of the plaintext. Holders of these keys can compute these functions but never access the full plaintext.

FE was introduced in 2011 by Dan Boneh, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Constructions for arbitrary functions followed in 2013, but with computationally intensive requirements. Subsequent developments in 2021 introduced constructions based on well-established cryptographic assumptions, potentially paving the way for practical FE implementations.

In Bitcoin covenant constructions, f is a signing function, taking a transaction tx as input and producing a signature. Since this signature depends on both a private key and the transaction, it requires at least two inputs, making Rubin’s design use multi-input FE.

Crucially: f does not directly sign with the private key k. Instead, it derives a new key pair by modifying k with a hash of the covenant’s spending policy. Signatures produced by f are valid for the tweaked public key, not the original P.

Setting Up FE-Based Covenants

To enable FE-based covenants, a setup authority is required. It generates:

  • Bitcoin key pair: private key k and public key P
  • FE key pair: master secret msk and FE public key mpk

The authority publishes P, mpk, k encrypted with mpk, and the functional key for f, derived from msk. The authority must destroy k and msk to prevent unauthorized signing.

With this setup, an unlimited number of new covenants can be created, each with its dedicated key pair, derived from the spending policy.

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